Several data management challenges arise in the context of Internet advertising networks, where Internet advertisers pay Internet publishers to display advertisements on their Web sites and drive traffic to the advertisers from surfers' clicks. Although advertisers can target appropriate market segments, the model allows dishonest publishers to defraud the advertisers by simulating fake traffic to their own sites to claim more revenue. This paper addresses the case of publishers launching fraud attacks from numerous machines, which is the most widespread scenario. The difficulty of uncovering these attacks is proportional to the number of machines and resources exploited by the fraudsters. In general, detecting this class of fraud entails solving a new data mining problem, which is finding correlations in multidimensional data. Since the dimensions have large cardinalities, the search space is huge, which has long allowed dishonest publishers to inflate their traffic, and deplete the advertisers' advertising budgets. We devise the approximate SLEUTH algorithms to solve the problem efficiently, and uncover single-publisher frauds. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SLEUTH both analytically and by reporting some of its results on the Fastclick network, where numerous fraudsters were discovered.
INTRODUCTION
Internet advertising is crucial for the success of the entire Internet, and has evolved into an ideal choice for small and large businesses to target their advertisements to the appropriate customers on the fly. Hence, Internet advertising contributes to the well being of e-commerce. An Internet advertiser, such as eBay, provides an advertising commissioner, say, Valueclick, with its advertisements, allocates a budget, and sets a commission for each customer action, e.g. advertisement clicking, auction bidding, or purchasing. The Internet publishers, for instance neopets.com or myspace.com, mo-tivated by the commission paid by the advertisers, contract with the commissioner to display advertisements on their sites. Advertising covers the running expenses of such sites, and thus, advertising also supports the intellectual value of the Internet.
The main orchestrators in this setting are the commissioners between publishers and advertisers, whose servers are the backstage for targeting and budgeting. Whenever a surfer visits a publisher's site, the surfer is referred to the commissioner's servers. The commissioner picks an advertisement to display on the publisher's site, and logs the impression (advertisement rendering). If the surfer clicks the advertisement, (s)he is referred to the commissioner that logs the click, and clicks-through the surfer to the advertiser's site.
Since publishers are paid by the traffic they drive to advertisers, there is an incentive for fraudsters to inflate the number of impressions and clicks their sites generate [1, 3, 14, 18, 25, 27, 28, 30, 34] . Even more, on real networks, we notice some fraudsters disguised as publishers, hijack some sites (mirror them under different domains), sign up online with the commissioners for those sites, provide a PayPal R account for anonymity, and start simulating traffic and earning revenue. Equally important is the hazard of dishonest advertisers simulating clicks on the advertisements of their competitors to deplete their advertising budgets [23, 31] , which impedes the campaigns of their competitors. Failing to identify fraudulent traffic results in bad reputation for the commissioner, and sometimes in paying forfeitures to advertisers [19, 20] . This kind of fraud is jeopardizing, not only the industry of search engines and Internet advertising, but also the entire Internet [13] .
Modern online advertising dynamics entail detecting fraud in this huge traffic environment in near real-time, as illustrated in Figure 1. Since advertisers monitor their campaigns online, commissioners provide advertisers with (usually) hourly campaign reports about the traffic and expenditure of campaigns. These campaign reports should be almost exact since advertisers change their budgets (or bids on keywords if applicable) based on the traffic quality and cost [24] . Hence, it is desirable to detect fraud, for the (hourly) campaign report window, in time less than the span of the window. If fraud detection lags behind by several window spans, advertisers experience poor quality of service, since their budgets will be managed based on misleading campaign reports that reflect both fraudulent and legitimate traffic. Moreover, debiting advertisers' accounts, and later crediting them for detected fraudulent payments, incurs high accounting overhead, and makes fraud detection non-transparent to advertisers. From a data mining perspective, the problem scale is challenging, since an average-sized commissioner receives around 70M records hourly. Thus, a fraud detection system should process each traffic entry in no more than 50μs, which allows for only very efficient algorithms. We focus primarily on publishers' fraud where a publisher tries to increase its revenue with fraud traffic. The detection approach and mechanism can be generalized to advertisers' fraud. Our approach for detecting fraud is based on mining the commissioner's traffic logs. The main premise of our traffic analysis approach is to draw correlation between the fraudster's site and the machines used in the attack. To circumvent log analysis, fraudsters strive to dilute the strong correlation between their sites and the machines from which the attacks are launched [29] . This can be done either on the side of the attacking machines or on the side of the attackers' sites. Hence, an attack is either performed by a single-publisher who generates traffic from numerous machines, possibly while obliterating or frequently changing the identification of these machines; or by a group of fraudsters sharing their resources to launch a coalition attack. This paper, concentrates on single-publisher attacks, which is the most common case in advertising networks. Detecting singlepublisher attacks complements our coalition attack discovery algorithms proposed in [28] . Detecting these two classes of attacks leaves no chances for fraudsters to escape. The proposed framework was deployed on one of the major world networks, Fastclick, and was successfully used in fraud detection.
This paper models discovering single-publisher attacks as a new problem of finding correlations in multidimensional data. We devise the SLEUTH algorithms for detecting single-publisher attacks in their most general form. The tunability, effectiveness, and accuracy of the SLEUTH algorithms are demonstrated through comprehensive experiments on the Fastclick network. The SLEUTH algorithms discovered several suspects, most of which were verified manually to be fraudsters, and their contracts were terminated.
We start by describing the economics of online single-publisher attack detection in § 2. § 3 presents the detection approach for single-publisher attacks. The problem model is built in § 4. We devise the 2-Pass-SLEUTH and 1-Pass-SLEUTH algorithms in § 5 and § 6, respectively, and contrast their performance in § 7. Our experimental results are reported in § 8. We present the related work in § 9, and we conclude in § 10.
ECONOMICS OF SINGLE-PUBLISHER ATTACKS
We start by establishing the association between the number of machines used in a single-publisher attack and the difficulty of detecting the attack. Then, we discuss the economics of detecting single-publisher attacks as an optimization problem.
The Association Between Attack Sophistication and Detection Difficulty
Understandably, the difficulty of detecting an attack increases as the number of machines from which the attack is launched increases. In its simplest form, launching an attack from one machine, identified by one cookie-ID, can be detected trivially by checking for duplicate impressions and clicks [25] . However, launching an attack from multiple machines is much harder to detect, since the detection algorithm has to examine the relationship between each publisher and all the machines generating its traffic.
Although the straightforward use of network anonymization, e.g. tor.eff.org, is attractive for inexperienced fraudsters, it is not ef- Those services were designed to protect surfers' privacy. Hence, they block surfers' cookies [4] . Therefore, using network anonymization can be trivially detected by monitoring the percentage of cookie-less traffic per publisher and investigating publishers whose traffic deviates from the norm. Similarly, on real networks, we notice some novice fraudsters generating a lot of traffic from ISPs that assign virtual IP addresses to surfers, such as AOL R , in order to hide among legitimate traffic. However, the ranges of IPs of those ISPs are well known, and again, the ratio of the traffic of any publisher received from those ISPs is highly stable across all the publishers. Hence, such attacks are easily detected by examining the ratio of the traffic received from ISPs assigning virtual IPs as compared to the entire publisher's traffic. Hard-to-detect attacks from several machines could be costly and unscalable to launch. To have a normal percentage of cookie-less traffic, and a normal percentage of non-virtual ISPs' IPs, fraudsters are motivated to either own the attacking machines, or to control botnets of real surfers' machines through Trojans in order to use IPs and cookies of those real surfers. Even when botnets are used, attacks launched from a botnet of tens of thousands of machines infected by top-notch Trojans are more sporadic than attacks from tens of machines infected by off-the-shelf Trojans for two reasons. First, off-the-shelf Trojan code that is more popular is easily detected with anti-virus software. Hence, the majority of botnets cannot grow to huge sizes. Second, small botnets can still be powerful if coupled with high bandwidth [7] . Therefore, launching scalable attacks entails high cost or requires sophisticated Trojan-writing skills. This establishes the association between the difficulty of launching an attack and the difficulty of detecting it.
Minimizing the Damage of Single-Publisher Fraud Detection
This association on the fraudsters' side has its ramifications on the side of the detection approach, since most attacks are not highly sophisticated. On the other hand, as we try to detect more sophisticated attacks, we report more honest publishers as suspects (false positives). Discarding all suspects discounts massive traffic from honest suspects and forgoes the corresponding lawful revenue. Reducing the forgone lawful revenue requires scrutinizing the traffic and sales history of suspects via costly human investigation.
From Figure 1 , this is even more aggravated by the risk of not producing accurate campaign reports to advertisers in a timely fashion if not enough investigation workforce is employed [13, 24] . Hence, detecting more sophisticated attacks with very few honest suspects and producing accurate timely campaign reports are two conflicting goals. This dilemma incurs tremendous time-critical investigation cost on the commissioners, which raises the advertising cost. In the cases where the prices of the campaigns are fixed by the commissioner and not determined through auctions, it might force advertisers to switch to other commissioners that have less advertising cost. On the other hand, not detecting any attacks at all reduces the campaigns' effectiveness, and hence, raises the advertising cost of the commissioner as compared to its competitors. This also drives advertisers away from the commissioner.
Therefore, a commissioner typically has two extremes on the detection spectrum as shown in Figure 2 . One extreme is to employ a very aggressive detection algorithm that reports most publishers as suspects, and employ a massive number of human investigators in order to detect attacks from any number of machines, and produce timely campaign reports to advertisers. The other extreme is to employ a very lenient detection algorithm that reports few suspects, and deal with the cost of fraud attacks that jeopardizes the commissioner's effectiveness and reputation. Typically, the commissioner aims at reducing its suspects, to save on the human cost, while detecting the majority of attacks, which are not highly sophisticated. This corresponds to the trough of the total cost curve in Figure 2. 
Research Objective
While exactly calculating the optimal total fraud cost is out of the scope of this work because of lack of measured and estimated costs of fraud and detection, we provide a tool for the commissioner to find the sweet spot where the total cost curve becomes almost minimal. The goal of this work is to provide an algorithmic tradeoff between detecting attacks from a larger number of machines versus decreasing the number of honest suspects reported as fraudulent.
Through this research, we reduce the total fraud cost by devising an effective detection mechanism whose aggressiveness can be tuned to explore the tradeoff between the fraud and detection costs, in order to minimize the total cost of single-publisher attacks.
DETECTION APPROACH FOR SINGLE-PUBLISHER ATTACKS
We now discuss the first steps towards detecting single-publisher attacks. We develop an approach based on how fraudsters can use their resources to launch scalable attacks. We then use this development to present our tunable detection methodology.
Efficiently Using Resources
Although the fraudster's resources can be limited, there are intelligent ways to increase the sophistication of the attack. Attacks can be made very difficult to detect by frequently changing the identification (IP or cookie ID) of the attacking machines so that the traffic appears as if coming from a large number of machines. As fraud detectives, this makes associating the attacking machines with the fraudster very challenging.
Frequently Changing the IP
Although the attack might be generated from a limited number of machines, say 10, the attacker can change the real IP addresses assigned by the ISP to the attacking machines. Every time a connection (e.g. dial-up) is made to the ISP, the ISP assigns a single real IP address to the account. There is a chance that disconnecting and reconnecting changes the IP address assigned to the machine. However, most ISPs start a session with every connection and assign a new IP only after session expiration. The duration of such sessions is around 30 minutes [17] . Therefore, attackers have to disconnect, wait for the session to expire, and then reconnect again to be assigned a new real IP. This activity throttles the attacking machine. Even if the fraudsters control a moderate number of machines, say 100, their bandwidth will be throttled.
As mentioned earlier, connecting to the Internet through an ISP that uses virtual IPs is trivially detected. Using real IPs and changing them slows down the attack. This makes changing the cookie IDs of the machines the most popular way to scale up the attack.
Frequently Changing the Cookie:
The NAT-Masquerading Attack
To make the best use of the IPs, the fraudster can frequently change the cookie identification of the attacking machines, and hence, make the traffic resemble that of Network Address Translation (NAT) boxes. We demonstrate one such attack in Figure 3 . The NAT-Masquerading attack is one way the attackers can increase the number of cookies used in the attack. For each machine connected to the Internet through a unique IP, the attacker starts without a cookie, requests the publisher's page, and thus the machine is assigned a valid cookie with a new ID from the commissioner. This cookie is automatically stored in the "Cookies" folder. The script moves this cookie to a different folder, and repeats the process many times. After the machine ends up with a bank of valid cookies that were assigned by the commissioner, the script selects a random cookie from the cookie bank, returns it to the "Cookies" folder, and makes a fake impression and/or click with this cookie, whose ID is reported to the commissioner. The script returns the cookie to the bank folder, selects another cookie, and so on.
The NAT-Masquerading Attack Strengths
Attacks like NAT-Masquerading are very attractive for fraudsters. A fraudster only needs a small number of IPs, and a script that is easy to write. The traffic can pass as normal cookie-identified traffic from numerous surfers behind some NAT boxes. The attack scales well even from a small pool of IPs.
In addition to its simplicity, and inexpensiveness, we discovered that the NAT-Masquerading attack is widely used since it is difficult for commissioners to detect, due to the following reasons:
1. 
Shifting the Focus from Cookies to IPs
To detect the generalized single-publisher attacks, the detection algorithm should go beyond examining cookies. As fraud detectives, we should not rely solely on detecting traffic entries with the same cookies [25] . Since the general forms of attacks, like NATMasquerading, reduce the reliability of cookies information, we should examine the relationship between publishers and IPs. We should identify outlier activities of publishers with respect to IPs 1 . Such abnormalities reflect all attacks as discussed next.
One such abnormality could be a publisher whose traffic is monopolized by a few IPs. This could be a fraudster using these IP to launch an attack. However, this measure is overly aggressive, since some IPs, like those of legitimate NAT boxes, are shared by numerous computers, and could generate most of a publisher's traffic.
The complementary abnormal behavior, of some IPs directing a considerable portion of their traffic to a specific site, could reveal IPs used by a fraudster. Yet, it could also be a site, like myspace.com 2 , which is highly popular among numerous IPs. Thus, we need to normalize the traffic and detect active pairs of publishers and IPs. We are searching for correlations that do not reflect the average activity of the IP and the publisher. An inactive IP should be generating little traffic for most publishers. Similarly, an unpopular site should receive slim traffic from most IPs. We are looking for unpopular sites receiving most of their traffic from inactive IPs that are only active for this specific sites, i.e., sites and IPs that are strongly coupled.
PROBLEM FORMALIZATION
Now, we build a model for detecting attacks from several IPs.
Modeling the Problem
Abstractly, the incoming traffic entries can be viewed as independent elements with two dimensions, the publisher, and the IP. The event of generating a traffic entry for a publisher, x, has sample probability P (x). Similarly, the occurrence of an IP, y, has sample probability P (y). To model the problem, we make the following assumption. ASSUMPTION 1. The probabilities, P (x) and P (y), of observing x and y, respectively, are normally independent.
That is P (x ∧ y), the sample probability of publisher x receiving a traffic entry from IP y, is given by P (x)P (y). For example, in a dataset, let x have P (x) = 0.001, and y have P (y) = 2.5 * 10 −4 , if x and y are uncorrelated, the commissioner should receive a traffic entry from IP y to publisher x with probability 2.5 * 10 −7 . We model the problem of detecting single-publisher attacks as identifying publishers correlated with several IPs, which clearly violates Assumption 1. As we seek weaker correlations, we report more honest suspects, though such anomalies are the primary suspects that could be investigated, a costly time-critical process. Assumption 1 is validated through real network analysis in § 8.2.1, where we report the number of honest suspects of this assumption. This is a manifestation of the tradeoff between discovering more single-publisher attacks, and minimizing the cost of fraud detection, as discussed in § 2.2. The more attacks we try to discover, the weaker the correlations we target, the more the honest suspects, and the higher the detection cost.
Based on Assumption 1, there should exist a high correlation between a fraudster and the IPs s(he) exploits. Hence, for each publisher, we should search for IPs that generate a significant portion of this publisher's traffic.
However, this metric might be overly aggressive, since some active IPs naturally generate significant portions of the traffic of numerous publishers. Therefore, we should not suspect IPs which are active for several publishers. In other words, we report a correlated pair of a publisher and an IP only if the publisher receives a significant portion of its traffic from this IP, while the IP is driving a non-trivial percentage of its traffic to the publisher's site.
To model the solution, we borrow a definition from the data streams literature, and build on it. We define a correlated pair as one where the IP is a frequent 3 element for the publisher, and the publisher is a frequent element for the IP.
Formal Problem Definition
We formulate the problem of detecting correlations in a 2-dimensional stream as follows. Given a stream S of size N of 2-dimensional data entries, and two user 4 defined frequency thresholds φ, and ψ, both in the interval (0, 1); find all pairs, such that for each discovered pair, (x, y), it is true that F (x, y) > φF (x) , and that F (x, y) > ψF (y) ; where F (x, y) is the number of occurrences of the pair (x, y) in S; F (x) is the aggregate number of occurrences of all the pairs with x as its first dimension value; and F (y) is the aggregate number of occurrences of all the pairs with y as its second dimension value.
For notational purposes, we denote the stream of pairs which have publisher x as its first dimension, Sx, and call it the traffic of publisher x. Similarly, Sy stands for the traffic of IP y. F (x) is the size of Sx, and F (y) is the size of Sy. We also denote the set of distinct publishers in the first dimension A1; and the set of distinct IPs in the second dimension A2. We say an IP y is φ−frequent for publisher x, if F (x, y) > φF (x) ; and publisher x is ψ−frequent
The two frequency thresholds φ, and ψ are the means by which the commissioner adjusts the aggressiveness of the algorithm. Notice that the thresholds and the algorithms presented hereafter can be tuned according to the nature of publishers and IPs. That is, the commissioner can group the publishers based on their traffic size or the level of confidence, and sets different φ thresholds for different groups of publishers. Similarly different ψ thresholds can be used for different groups of IPs. However, for simplicity, we assume one φ across all publishers and one ψ across all IPs.
The higher the φ, and ψ, the stronger the correlation sought, the fewer the honest suspects, and the lower the fraud detection cost as discussed in § 2.2.
To Stream or Not to Stream
We have borrowed the problem of frequent elements on data streams to formalize the problem of finding correlation in 2-dimensional streams. In reality, some networks might relax the requirement of detecting fraud in a stream environment. While still analyzing traffic in near real-time, the goal could be relaxed to process the traffic window in time that is less than the window span. This relaxation on the application side leaves room for multi-pass algorithms.
To use a single-pass or multi-pass algorithms is a network design decision. We expect multi-pass algorithms to be more accurate than single-pass algorithms, due to their ability of verifying estimates of frequencies on several passes. Higher accuracy means fewer suspects to manually investigate, and lower detection cost.
On the other hand, from an application perspective, a single-pass algorithm allows reporting suspects at any time. In contrast, multipass algorithms have to scan the entire stream at least once before reporting suspects when a query is posed, which introduces some latency in query response time. This gives single-pass algorithms an advantage, especially when dealing with large traffic windows, say days or weeks. This property of online responding to queries is crucial for customer satisfaction, if real-time handling of advertisers' complaints is a network design goal. This way, advertisers can contact the commissioner about suspicious traffic, and the commissioner can respond to their concerns almost instantaneously. From a system design standpoint, single-pass algorithms enable cumulatively monitoring of traffic, and issuing queries at any point, without necessarily defining when the analysis window ends a priori.
At Fastclick, we decided to employ a single-pass streaming algorithm due to the above reasons. However, we also explored the multi-pass option. We developed, 2-Pass-SLEUTH, a two-pass algorithm as an effort in this direction. 2-Pass-SLEUTH was developed further into our streaming 1-Pass-SLEUTH algorithm. Before we describe the algorithms in § 5 and § 6, we comment on the infeasibility of an exact solution in a stream environment.
Infeasibility of an Exact Stream Solution
The problem of exactly detecting correlations is infeasible on streams, as shown in Theorem 1. THEOREM 1. Any exact solution for the problem of detecting correlations in multidimensional streams requires keeping exact and complete information about all pairs in the stream.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction for 2-dimensional streams, and the generalization for higher dimensions is straightforward. Given a 1-dimensional stream, q1, q2, . . . , qI , . . . , qN , of size N , construct a 2-dimensional stream of pairs of size N as follows, (q, q1), (q, q2), . . . , (q, qI ), . . . , (q, qN ), by appending some element, q, as the first value for all pairs. An answer to the query about correlations in the constructed stream with thresholds φ and ψ = 1 − 1 N can be directly translated into an answer to a query about frequent elements in the original stream with threshold φ. Answering the exact query about the constructed 2-dimensional stream without complete information contradicts the fact that finding exact frequent elements in a stream requires complete information about all elements [6, 11] .
2 From Theorem 1, an exact solution entails keeping complete information about the traffic. The traffic can be stored in a large 2-dimensional array of publishers and IPs. Every time the commissioner receives a new impression or click, the corresponding cell gets incremented. Storing an array of the traffic of publishers and IPs is infeasible. There are approximately 2 32 = 4G IPs, and an average commissioner has around 50,000 publishers. An array with a traffic counter for each pair will contain more than 214 * 10 12 cells. If each cell is a 4-Byte integer, the array size is approximately 1 PetaByte. The other extreme is trading space for speed. Since this array is very sparse, it can be stored using a sparse matrix representation [32] . However, the sparse matrix representation entails access time linear in the cardinality of at least one dimension. This is not suitable for real-time updates and queries.
We are not aware of any stream mining solution for the proposed problem. This is one generalization of the frequent elements [22] in data streams for higher dimensionality. The problem of frequent elements in streams has been generalized before in other contexts. The notion of frequent elements was generalized for hierarchies in [8] , where an element can only be frequent if the sum of frequencies of its infrequent children satisfies the threshold. The notion was then re-generalized for higher dimensionality in [9] . A singledimensional stream was summarized in [27] using a 2-dimensional structure containing antecedents and consequents of associations between frequent pairs of elements that are not widely separated in the stream. However, none of the algorithms in [8, 9, 27] can be modified to handle the problem in hand. Also, we are not aware of any other data mining algorithm that can be, which necessitates devising a new approximate algorithm.
DEVELOPING A TWO-PASS SCHEME
In this section, we investigate how to detect single-publisher fraud instances by efficiently identifying correlations in multidimensional data over large domains. We start by proposing a twopass scheme, 2-Pass-SLEUTH, in § 5.1. Then, we give its implementation details in § 5.2. We develop 2-Pass-SLEUTH into the single-pass scheme, 1-Pass-SLEUTH, in § 6.
2-Pass-SLEUTH: the Big Picture
In the first discovery pass, a set of IPs, the frequent group = ∀x∈A 1 {y|(y ∈ A2) ∧ (F (x, y) > φF (x) )}, is formed that contains all the IPs found to be φ−frequent for at least one publisher. For each publisher, x, a data structure is constructed that keeps track of which IPs are φ−frequent for x. After scanning the traffic, the publishers' data structures are queried for φ−frequent IPs. The second verification pass is made on the traffic to verify that each IP in the frequent group generates a high percentage of its traffic for the suspected publisher(s). For each IP, y in the frequent group, a data structure is constructed that reports the ψ−frequent publishers for y. After completing the second pass, all correlations
Although the formal problem is symmetric on both dimensions, we purposefully selected the publishers' dimension to handle in the first pass because the cardinality of the publishers is typically much smaller than that of the IPs (50,000 versus 4G). Our goal is a feasible and more accurate processing in the first pass to lessen the IPs to be examined in the second pass. Thus, the large cardinality of the IPs is reduced considerably from a processing standpoint.
To implement this scheme, we have to first identify frequent elements in one pass. Several approximate schemes [10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 22, 26] have been proposed to solve this problem, any of which can be employed to accurately report IPs that are frequent to specific publishers, as well as publishers who are frequent to specific IPs. We chose Space-Saving [26] for the reasons explained in § 6.
Implementing 2-Pass-SLEUTH
We now briefly describe how to implement the two-pass 2-Pass-SLEUTH scheme using Space-Saving [26] . We explain how SpaceSaving can be incorporated in the discovery pass to output the frequent group, and the discussion applies to the verification pass.
During the first discovery pass, a lightweight Stream-Summaryx structure is kept for each publisher, x. Stream-Summaryx is employed by Space-Saving to maintain partial information about exactly m IPs of interest, e1, e2, . . . , em, using m counters, where m is as specified later. At any time, each counter is monitoring a specific IP. Although Stream-Summary is a hash-based structure, the IPs monitored in Stream-Summaryx are sorted by their estimated frequencies. That is, e1 (em) has the highest (lowest) estimated frequency, Count(x, e1) (Count(x, em) ). If an IP is not monitored, its estimated frequency is 0.
Stream-Summaryx monitors the φ−frequent IPs for x with a guaranteed error rate, . Space-Saving guarantees that monitored IPs can have their hits overestimated by no more than F (x), and never underestimated. Regardless of the permutation of Sx, the guaranteed error rate, , decreases with the increase in the number of counters in Stream-Summaryx, m, and with the data skew. Even if all IPs contribute equally to Sx, i.e., in the worst case of uniform data, a permissible error rate, , is enforced with m at most is incremented, and the counter is moved to its correct position in Stream-Summaryx, in amortized constant time. If y is not monitored, i.e., no counter is assigned to y, then em, the IP that currently has the least estimated hits, min, is replaced with y. Since the actual hits of y can be any number between 1 and min + 1, SpaceSaving assigns Count(x, y) the value min + 1, since it gives elements the benefit of doubt not to underestimate frequencies. Thus, Space-Saving never misses a frequent IP but may report some infrequent IPs as frequent. For each IP, ei, in Stream-Summaryx, the algorithm keeps track of its maximum possible over-estimation, ε(x, ei), resulting from the initialization of its counter when inserted into the Stream-Summaryx. That is, when starting to monitor y, set ε(x, y) to the counter value that was evicted. Thus, at any time and for any IP, ei,
As depicted in Figure 5 , all publishers' Stream-Summary structures are stored in a hash table, Publisher-Hash-Table. This ensures constant amortized processing per traffic entry in the first pass.
After the completion of the first pass, for every publisher, x, the IPs in Stream-Summaryx are traversed in order of their estimated frequency, and all the IPs are output, until an IP is reached whose frequency is below φF (x) . Space-Saving guarantees that all identified φ−frequent IPs for any publisher, x, have frequencies no less than (φ − )F (x) . In addition, an IP y with F (x, y) > φF (x) is guaranteed to be reported. The frequent group is formed as a union of all the reported IPs, and the second verification pass is made on the traffic. For each IP, y, in the frequent group, the ψ−frequent publishers for y are found in a way similar to the one used in the discovery pass. Concurrent to this process, the frequent IPs discovered for each publisher in the discovery pass can be verified to remove uncertainties introduced by the error . To report
DETECTING CORRELATIONS IN ONE PASS
In § 6.1 and § 6.2, we develop the ideas in § 5 into a one-pass algorithm, 1-Pass-SLEUTH, and its Captured-Correlations structure.
Merging the Two Passes
The 2-Pass-SLEUTH scheme presented in § 5 accurately discovers correlations that can be manually inspected to discover fraud. However, it requires two passes on the traffic. In order to make only one pass on the traffic, publishers that are frequent for IPs must be discovered in this single pass. Simultaneous discovery of ψ−frequent publishers in, Sy, for each IP, y, in the traffic window is not feasible. The reason is, in large samples of real data, the number of distinct IPs occurring in a dataset of length N is roughly found to be 
Selecting IPs to Monitor
The IPs which should have their traffic monitored are those that would appear in the frequent group at the end of the discovery pass in the two-pass scheme. Those are the IPs that are φ−frequent for at least one publisher. The ψ−frequent publishers of these IPs should be known in order to verify the suspects discovered on the publishers' dimension. The rest of the IPs, the infrequent group = {y|(y ∈ A2) ∧ (∀x ∈ A1, F (x, y) ≤ φF (x) )} , are not φ−frequent to any publisher. Due to time and space constraints, it is desirable not to monitor the traffic of IPs in the infrequent group, since they have no chance of signaling fraud. In reality, IPs in the frequent group can only be known after the discovery pass.
We follow a best-effort approach to answer the above question. We integrate the verification pass into the discovery pass by identifying the IPs of the frequent group as early as possible. In Theorem 6, we will establish the correctness of our algorithm by showing that the IPs discovered early to belong to the frequent group, are accurate and complete under very reasonable assumptions.
Every IP that becomes φ−frequent for at least one publisher in the course of the pass should have its traffic monitored, to verify the suspects discovered on the publishers' dimensions by the end of the pass. The earlier we correctly classify an IP to belong to the frequent group, the bigger the analyzed portion of the traffic of this IP. Thus, the answer to the above question lies in the following.
Early and accurate identification of IPs that belong to the frequent group is necessary to feasibly and precisely detect correlations.
However, the set of IPs identified as frequent over time can be unbounded, since some IPs can be identified as φ−frequent for some publisher in the course of the pass, but are deemed infrequent by the end of pass. To wisely allocate space for monitoring IPs, the traffic of an IP that becomes φ−infrequent for all publishers should stop being monitored.
Hence, we need to employ an accurate frequent elements algorithm that continuously report, for each publisher, which infrequent IPs are becoming frequent, as well as which frequent IPs are becoming infrequent. This is the reason we selected the Space-Saving algorithm, since it can incrementally answer continuous queries about frequent elements in a data stream, with negligible constant space and time overheads. 
Bootstrapping the Monitored IPs
Once we identify an IP, y, as being φ−frequent for at least one publisher, the traffic of y should be monitored using a new StreamSummaryy that should be initialized wisely.
The straightforward initialization approach is to collect information about y from all publishers. For each publisher, x, the algorithm should read Count(x, y) from Stream-Summaryx and insert it into Stream-Summaryy . However, this makes the processing time of the traffic entries linear in the number of publishers, which is impractical. We follow a more pragmatic approach.
We sample Sy to populate Stream-Summaryy. The biggest available unbiased sample of Sy is the part of the traffic not yet observed. Our goal is to make the number of publishers' hits in Stream-Summaryy a consistent scale-down of the true hits the publishers have received since the very beginning of the pass. Thus, we create an empty Stream-Summaryy, and set the counter of x in Stream-Summaryy , Count(y, x), to 1.
The 1-Pass-SLEUTH Algorithm and the Captured-Correlations Structure
Now, we describe the Captured-Correlations structure, and how it is utilized to summarize correlations between publishers and IPs.
The Captured-Correlations Structure
The Captured-Correlations structure consists of two components. First, the Publisher-Hash-Table contains a Stream-Summary structure for each publisher as explained in § 5.2. Stream-Summaryx monitors the φ−frequent IPs for x as illustrated in Figure 5 .
The second component, as depicted in Figure 6 , is the IP-Hash- , and η is the maximum error rate the commissioner allows in discovering ψ−frequent publishers in the IPs' dimension.
Meanwhile, for any IP, y, the number of publishers y is currently frequent for is stored in the counter Count f req (y). If an IP, y, is currently frequent for at least one publisher, then it is expected to belong to the frequent group, and its traffic should be monitored in IP-Hash-Table. The purpose of keeping Count f req (y) is to stop monitoring the traffic of IP y, and free the space used by pairy once Count f req (y) is decremented to 0. When this happens, y is no more expected to belong to the frequent group.
The ϕ Reduced Threshold
In order to allow for early discovery of the IPs that belong to the frequent group, we reduce the frequency at which the publishers' Stream-Summary structures report an IP to be frequent or infrequent. For a publisher, x, instead of reporting an IP, y, to be frequent when Count(x, y) reaches φF (x), y is reported as frequent when Count(x, y) reaches ϕF (x), where F (x) is the number of hits seen so far for publisher x, ϕ is a user specified reduced threshold 5 , and ≤ ϕ ≤ φ. This enables more accurate monitoring of traffic of IPs in the frequent group.
Similarly, the Stream-Summary of an IP, y, is deleted from IPHash-Table only when its frequency drops below the reduced threshold for all publishers, i.e., Count(x, y) < ϕF (x) for every publisher, x. This delayed deletion of the Stream-Summary of an infrequent IP gives it a chance to become frequent again without loosing information about its past traffic.
Using ϕ instead of φ to assign Stream-Summary structures to IPs, and incrementing or decrementing their counters in IP-HashTable entails some overhead, since some IPs in the infrequent group will have their traffic monitored. However, as larger portions of the traffic of IPs are monitored, fewer honest suspects are output, which reduces the human cost significantly.
The 1-Pass-SLEUTH Algorithm
The 1-Pass-SLEUTH algorithm is sketched in Figure 7 . For every observed pair (x, y), the algorithm selects the Stream-Summary that monitors x, and increments the counter of y in Stream-Summaryx. Once the traffic is scanned by 1-Pass-SLEUTH and CapturedCorrelations is built, the user can query for correlations. The AnomalyAlarm algorithm that reports correlations efficiently is straightforward. As described in Figure 8 , the algorithm checks all the publishers in the first dimension. For each publisher, x, it finds all IPs that are φ−frequent for x. For each IP, y, it checks if x is ψ−frequent in Stream-Summaryy . If both frequency conditions hold, this pair (x, y) is reported as a possible fraud instance.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE SLEUTH ALGORITHMS
Now, we briefly comment on the performance of 2-Pass-SLEUTH and 1-Pass-SLEUTH from an analytical perspective. We analyze the accuracy, and the processing time of the SLEUTH algorithms. Correlations(m, n) [26] , the first and the fourth steps consume amortized constant time. We will show that the second and the third steps also consume amortized constant time.
Run Times of the SLEUTH Algorithms
Any element, q, can only become ϕ−frequent in a Stream-Summary data structure, when q is incremented. Hence, the number of times q is reported as ϕ−frequent is no more than the number of occurrences of q. Bearing in mind that an element can only become ϕ−infrequent if it was originally ϕ−frequent, we deduce that the number of times q is reported as ϕ−infrequent is no more than the number of occurrences of q. Generalizing that to all the IPs that occur in Sx, for any publisher x, it follows that the total number of times of the elements are reported as frequent or infrequent is no more than 2F (x). Dividing this by the size of Sx, then for every hit to x, the average number of IPs reported as frequent or infrequent is at most 2. Since processing counter increments, or decrements, and creating or deleting Stream-Summary data structures is done in an amortized constant time because of the hash table, then the second and third steps are done in amortized constant time.
Hence, the four steps have amortized constant time. 
Space Usages of the SLEUTH Algorithms
From Theorems 4 and 5, 1-Pass-SLEUTH consumes more space, since φ > ϕ. However, the space requirements of both algorithms are bounded, and can be accommodated on current machines. 
THEOREM 4. The space used by 2-Pass-SLEUTH is O(|A1|
* ( 1 + 1 φ * η )),|A 1 | ϕ * η ). 2
Accuracy of the 1-Pass-SLEUTH Algorithm
Although 1-Pass-SLEUTH monitors the traffic of IPs approximately, since their traffic is monitored after they are frequent for at least one publisher, practically, its accuracy is very high. Assuming that the traffic characteristics of non-fraudulent publishers and IPs are stable within the analyzed window, for every fraudster, 1-Pass-SLEUTH guarantees reporting all its exploited IPs as stated in Theorem 6.
Violations of this assumption are expectedly uncommon as the traffic window analyzed is typically an hour or a few hours. Since, fraudsters cannot forcefully influence the traffic of honest sites contracting with the commissioner, they cannot use this assumption to escape 1-Pass-SLEUTH. Proof. For any fraudulent pair (x, y), let |S |, and F (x, y) denote the number of hits observed after the creation of StreamSummaryy, for all pairs, and for (x, y), respectively. Let N be the size of the entire stream. Sx will consist of alternating onsegments, where y is φ−frequent in Stream-Summaryx, and offsegments, where y is φ−infrequent in Stream-Summaryx. Since, by the end of S, y is φ−frequent for x, then Sx ends in an onsegment. During an on-segment, the traffic of y is guaranteed to be monitored. Therefore, the traffic of y cannot start being monitored amidst an on-segment. That is, just before monitoring the traffic of y, y was φ−infrequent in Stream-Summaryx, and was φ−frequent for x in the portion of Sx after Stream-Summaryy was last created, even if this portion contains off-segments. Hence,
> φ, where F (x) is the number of hits observed for x after creating Stream-Summaryy.
If the traffic characteristics of non-fraudulent pairs do not change drastically within the stream, for any non-fraudulent pair (x, y), the following holds.
|S |
For the rest of the proof, we assume rough equality holds with high probability. Without loss of generality, let x be the only fraudster exploiting y, and y is exploited by x only. Summing Equation 1 for all IPs except y yields
. Thus,
for this fraudulent pair.
Summing Equation 1 for all sites except x yields
. Since x is ψ−frequent for y, then F (x, y) > ψF (y), and hence,
Thus, y gets reported as φ−frequent for x, and x gets reported as ψ−frequent for y. 2
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
After analyzing the performance and the usability of 2-Pass-SLEUTH and 1-Pass-SLEUTH, we report their behavior on the Fastclick network. We experimented with a 45-minute traffic trace of 54,045,873 entries. We evaluated the effectiveness and accuracy of the algorithms. In addition, we explored the tradeoff between the fraud and the detection costs, discussed in § 2.2.
Algorithmic Assessment
The proposed algorithms were implemented in C++, and were executed on a Pentium IV 2.66 GHz, with 1.0 GB RAM. For 2-Pass-SLEUTH and 1-Pass-SLEUTH, in order to measure the recall (the number of correct elements found as a percentage of the number of actual correct elements) and the precision (the number of correct elements found as a percentage of the entire output), we had to implement an exact solution. The goal is to measure the algorithmic accuracy of the SLEUTH algorithms as compared to an exact algorithm that exactly solves the correlations problem in multidimensional streams. This should not be confused with whether the suspects are fraudulent or not.
We implemented a linked-list representation of the sparse matrix of publishers and IPs, and used it to calculate the correct correlations. However, to process a data sample of size less than 3M entries, the sparse matrix approach ran in over 84 hours.
So, we had to retreat to a smarter exact algorithm. We implemented Exact, a single-pass hash-based algorithm that keeps information about the size of the traffic of every publisher-IP pair observed in the dataset. Although Exact cannot realistically be used to analyze large datasets, it provides all the correlations when used for smaller datasets. We dissected the traffic dataset by time into 15 data samples that were of roughly equal sizes. Thus, on small datasets, Exact makes it possible to measure the recall and the precision, and assess the savings of the approximate SLEUTH algorithms.
To evaluate the strengths of the SLEUTH algorithms, we ran comprehensive experiments with values of φ and ψ varying from 0.1 to 1.0 on a fixed interval of 0.1. For simplicity, we used the same φ for all publishers and the same ψ for all IPs. Throughout the experiments, ϕ was set to φ 2
. m was set to 
The Effectiveness of the SLEUTH Algorithms
We examined how the algorithms behave as φ changes. We issued queries for finding correlations with ψ fixed at 0.1. We varied φ from 0.1 to 1.0 on a fixed interval of 0.1. We then examined how the algorithms behave as ψ changes, and varied ψ from 0.1 to 1.0 on a fixed interval of 0.1, with φ fixed at 0.1. Every query was issued against the 15 data samples. For various φ, the average space, run time, recall, and precision for 2-Pass-SLEUTH, 1-Pass-SLEUTH, and Exact are plotted in Figures 9(a) through 9(d) , respectively. For various ψ, the performance metrics are plotted in Figure 10 .
The Space and Time Efficiency of SLEUTH.
From Figures 9(a) and 10(a), the space consumptions of the SLEUTH algorithms were at most one fifth that of Exact when both φ and ψ were 0.1. Since Exact keeps complete information, its space usage was constant for all φ values. The space consumptions of the SLEUTH algorithms dropped as φ increased, since they kept fewer counters in the publishers' Stream-Summary structures. In addition, the number of IPs whose traffic was monitored decreased since fewer IPs qualified to be in the frequent group. On the other hand, their space usages dropped very slightly as ψ increased, since the SLEUTH algorithms kept fewer counters to monitor the traffic of each monitored IP. However, the number of such monitored IPs did not decrease. This is the reason the decrease in spaces of the SLEUTH algorithms was relatively slower with the increase in ψ than with the increase in φ. This is clear when comparing Figures 9(a) , and 10(a). The ratio of the space usage of the SLEUTH algorithms to Exact dropped from 1 : 5 to 1 : 20 as φ approached 1, while it decreased to 1 : 6 as ψ approached 1. On average, 2-Pass-SLEUTH consumed 10% less space than 1-Pass-SLEUTH, due to monitoring fewer IPs.
From Figures 9(b) and 10(b), the run times of the SLEUTH algorithms were almost constant. However, they ran 1.5 times faster than Exact in Figure 9 (b), and 1.2 times faster than Exact in Figure 10(b) . This is due to fewer increments on the IPs' dimension. On average, 2-Pass-SLEUTH ran 4% faster than 1-Pass-SLEUTH, since fewer IPs were monitored as the frequent group was identified more accurately. This speed difference shows both algorithms are CPU intensive. The second pass did not slow down 2-Pass-SLEUTH. Instead, 2-Pass-SLEUTH benefited from fewer increments on the IPs' dimension.
The Accuracy of SLEUTH.
The recall and precision of 2-Pass-SLEUTH were always constant at 1. The recall of 1-Pass-SLEUTH varied between 1 and 0.9997 throughout the experiments. From Figure 9 
Comments on the SLEUTH Effectiveness.
When compared to Exact, 2-Pass-SLEUTH runs faster, consumes less space, and gives exact results. However, 2-Pass-SLEUTH can only start the second pass after the end of the window. The second pass consumed 18% of its run time on average, which is consider- When compared to the single-pass Exact, 1-Pass-SLEUTH gives high quality results, uses a lot less space, and runs faster. However, it could be argued that the difference in space can be counteracted by cheap memory. The real strength of 1-Pass-SLEUTH is clearer when handling data of realistic sizes at a real time rate. The set of experiments presented above handles a very small dataset. On larger datasets, as explained in § 8.1.2, 1-Pass-SLEUTH consumes much less space than Exact. The larger space consumed by Exact makes it virtually impossible to process realistic datasets in real time, due to thrashing.
1-Pass-SLEUTH Onlineness
To assess the online nature of 1-Pass-SLEUTH, we had to examine its scalability. The goal is to show that traffic entries are processed continuously at a constant rate regardless of the window size. We conducted another set of experiments. We issued one query with φ = ψ = 0.1 on the complete traffic stream (54,045,873 entries). We measured the time and the space usages for the algorithms after every 2,000,000 entries, and plotted the results in Figure 12 . Clearly, Exact could not process the entire dataset due to thrashing.
From Figure 12 (a), Exact started thrashing after consuming 12M entries. Meanwhile, 1-Pass-SLEUTH only used 24MB and its space consumption was almost constant throughout the stream. The flat curve of 1-Pass-SLEUTH is a manifestation of its constant space usage that is a lot smaller than Exact.
In terms of execution time (Figure 12(b) ), Exact thrashed while 1-Pass-SLEUTH had a constant processing time per entry regardless of the window size, as is clear from its linear trend, until it finished after 19.65 minutes. The fact that it was able to process the traffic the commissioner received in 45 minutes (approximately 54M entry), in less than 20 minutes proves its ability to discover fraud in real time without any lag, and with the ability to report suspects with almost no query latency.
Comments on Findings
To evaluate the tradeoff between the weakness of the sought correlations and the number of honest suspects (false positives), we ran comprehensive experiments with various values of φ and ψ, and sketched the results in Figure 11 . Large values of φ and ψ produce fewer correlations, fewer honest suspects, and hence, lower cost of fraud detection. However, to look for fraudsters that are using numerous IPs, and forging slim traffic from each IP to stay under the radar level, the thresholds on φ and ψ were lowered. Although some honest suspects get reported, which raises the cost of fraud detection, the SLEUTH algorithms reduces the suspects dramatically compared to the case where they are not used.
For simplicity, we issued queries with φ = ψ. We varied them from 1.0 to 0.1 on a fixed interval of 0.1. For every run, when analyzing the traffic, we only considered publishers receiving at least 10 ψ hits, in order to reduce the noise of under-sampled publishers. The number of qualified publishers varied between 3.7k and 5.2k publishers, which is big enough to ensure the validity of the results. We comment on our findings, including validating Assumption 1, and report some statistics on the discovered fraudsters.
Assumption Validation
The problem of detecting single-publisher attacks was modeled as searching for correlations violating Assumption 1. Assumption 1 states that the two dimensions of publishers and IPs are almost independent. That is, there should be no strong correlation between x and y for any observed pair (x, y). Through analysis of real data, we show these correlations are very infrequent. We measured the number of publishers reported as suspects.
From Figure 11 , the percentage of the publishers reported increased from 0.06% of the qualified publishers, when φ and ψ were 1.0, to 6.37%, when φ and ψ were 0.1. The median percentage of qualified publishers reported as suspects, even for combinations of φ and ψ not shown in Figure 11 , was 0.42%. § 8.2.2 reports very few honest suspects to not only show the validity of Assumption 1, but also the high correlation between fraudsters and exploited IPs. Figure 11 is a manifestation of the tradeoff between the costs of the fraud and the detection mechanisms presented in § 2.2. As the number of suspects increased, the percentage of honest suspects also increased from 0% to 23.18% of the reported suspects (0% to 1.48% of the qualified publishers). The percentage of honest suspects was 0% when the φ and ψ were both more than 0.8. The median of honest suspects, even for combinations of φ and ψ not shown in Figure 11 , was 14.25%.
Tradeoff between Fraud and Detection Costs
A suspect was judged to be fraudulent or a false positive based primarily on the sales volume generated by its traffic. The sales information of around 52% of the advertisers contracting with Fastclick were available to judge the value of the traffic from each publisher. This is a good sample to judge all publishers since each publisher generates traffic to almost all the advertisers.
However, the sales information alone is not enough to judge publishers due to the lack of evidence of malicious behavior. Around 17.2% of the publishers had meager sales. Discarding all publishers with sparse sales underpays the commissioner for large honest traffic volumes, as discussed in § 2.2.
Comments on Discovered Frauds
Around 79.4% of the frauds discovered were from 8 IPs or fewer. Around 52.3% of which, used more than a single cookie for their attacks. This shows the proliferation of NAT-Masquerading.
It is also worth reporting that among our false positives, we discovered some publishers that were weakly correlated with a few IPs, such that the traffic of the IPs did not yield any sales. However, these publishers were generating sales from traffic from the rest of the IPs. We expect this correlation to be a result of either DDoS attacks; or as attacks of competitors of these publishers that aim at judging these honest suspects as fraudsters to terminate their contracts with commissioners. We discounted the traffic coming from these suspected IPs, but charged the advertisers for the traffic coming from the rest of the IPs.
RELATED WORK
After describing our single-publisher attack detection approach and evaluating it on Fastclick network, we summarize the related work to clarify the relevance of the considered problem. Click fraud has been a concern to commissioners since their conception [35] 6 . Classical fraud detection judges publishers based on metrics of advertisements on their sites, such as how the ratio of impressions to clicks (the Click Through Rate) for advertisements differs from the norms [18] . The classical approach depends on the commissioners' edge in knowing the network-wide behavior of each advertisement. Supposedly, this knowledge is only available to commissioners, since the traffic model conceals from the publishers the advertisements loaded and clicked on their sites.
However, the classical approach can be fooled by fraudsters who can take advantage of a specific site architecture that reveals the advertisements loaded and clicked [29] . This architecture is used by some trusted publishers, like CNN, to maximize revenue among several commissioners. Specifically, CNN redirects advertising traffic to a pool of servers operated by CNN before reaching the commissioners. This architecture reveals the advertisements loaded and clicked by surfers. If adopted by fraudsters, this architecture allows sampling the natural advertisements' behavior. Hence, fraudsters can automate traffic whose metrics comply with real traffic.
Furthermore, the classical approach cannot detect malicious intentions, and is designed to discard low-quality traffic, even if it is legitimate, where the quality of a click or an impression is an estimate of the probability it yields a sale. Aggressively discounting low-quality traffic whose metrics (e.g. CTR) deviate from the norms, or that yields no sales "underpays" honest publishers and commissioners for massive legitimate traffic delivered by their servers.
The main challenge is to distinguish fraudulent traffic from normal traffic. Asking for the cooperation of surfers, as proposed by the cryptographic approaches [3, 30] , entails changing the advertising network model to be non-transparent to all surfers, which is unscalable. Moreover, they require the commissioners to uniquely identify surfers, which compromises surfers' privacy.
Analyzing the traffic data, which alleviates the drawbacks of both the cryptographic and classical approaches, was first proposed in [25] . Since commissioners face the dilemma of preserving surfers' privacy versus detecting fraud, they can only perform traffic-mining techniques on aggregate data using temporary surfers' identification, cookie IDs and IP addresses. This identification is temporary and stores no personal identification to preserve surfers' privacy. Meanwhile, machines used in the attacks are still identified enough for satisfactory fraud detection.
Detecting click fraud attacks has recently attracted much attention. In [25] , we proposed a simple Bloom filter-based [2] algorithm that detects a naïve click fraud attack, where the publisher runs a script that continuously loads its page and simulates clicks on the advertisements in the page. The solution detects duplicates in a stream of impressions or clicks within a short period of time, like an hour. Experiments on real data were revealing. One of the advertisements was clicked 10,781 times by the same cookie ID in one day.
A more sophisticated click fraud attack was identified by Anupam et al. in [1] . It involves a coalition of dishonest publishers. In [27] , a solution was proposed for detecting this attack via cooperation between commissioners and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) through identifying associations in a stream of HTTP requests. [28] proposed a generalized coalition attacks detection mechanism by discovering sites that have similar traffic. Our real-data analysis in [28] shows that legitimate sites have highly dissimilar traffic. Sites that receive their traffic from highly similar sets of IPs are almost always suspicious. In [28] , we modeled the problem of detecting fraud coalitions in terms of the set similarity problem. We first proposed our Similarity-Seeker algorithm that uncovers coalitions of site pairs. We then extended the detection algorithm to detect coalitions of any size by finding all maximal cliques in a sites' similarity graph. On the Fastclick network, 93% of the detected sites were provably fraudsters.
Interestingly, data analysis techniques, like [25, 27, 28] , can identify specific patterns and correlations that characterizes fraudulent traffic [23] . Hence, this approach can reveal malicious intentions. Thus, it complements the classical tools that detect lowquality traffic and cannot distinguish it from fraudulent traffic.
Detecting single-publisher attacks complements our algorithms for coalition attacks [28] that involve coalitions between several fraudsters. Detecting these two classes of attacks leaves no chances for fraudsters to escape.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper explored the association between the sophistication of single-publisher attacks, and the difficulty of detecting such attacks; as well as the tradeoff between the single-publisher fraud cost and fraud detection costs. We modeled discovering singlepublisher attacks as finding correlations in multidimensional datasets. We devised the approximate 2-Pass-SLEUTH and 1-Pass-SLEUTH algorithms to solve the problem efficiently.
We demonstrated the effectiveness and accuracy of the proposed SLEUTH algorithms analytically. Our analytical evaluation was verified through comprehensive experiments on the Fastclick net- Although using the proposed framework, it is difficult to detect attacks from tens of thousands of IPs with a manageable ratio of honest suspects, attacks from tens and hundreds of IPs can still be detected with very few honest suspects. The good news is two folds. First, the number of honest suspects (false positives) is very limited. Interestingly, among the reported correlations, manual investigations detected numerous fraudsters whose contracts were terminated. Second, such attacks are the majority of the attacks due to the difficulty of using tens of thousands of IPs in attacks. Hence, the false positives are also expected to be very few.
Publishing this technique of fraud detection does not help fraudsters escaping detection. To reduce this correlation between the fraudsters' sites and the attacking machines, fraudsters can share traffic with each other to reduce the correlation between their sites and the exploited IPs. This is considered as a coalition attack, which has been successfully addressed in [28] by detecting attacks with traffic derived from similar sets of IPs. This work makes it very difficult for fraudsters to launch attacks from a small number of IPs. Hence, it increases the cost or the skills needed to launch single-publisher attacks, with a negligible cost on the commissioner's side.
